UFC 4-010-01
8 October 2003
CHAPTER 2
PHILOSOPHY, DESIGN STRATEGIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
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GENERAL. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the philosophy on
which these standards are based, the design strategies that are their foundation, and
the assumptions inherent in their provisions. Effective implementation of these
standards depends on a reasonable understanding of the rationale for them. With this
understanding, engineers and security and antiterrorism personnel can maximize the
efficiency of their solutions for complying with these standards while considering site-
specific issues and constraints that might dictate measures beyond these minimums.
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PHILOSOPHY. The overarching philosophy upon which this document is
based is that comprehensive protection against the range of possible threats may be
cost prohibitive, but that an appropriate level of protection can be provided for all DoD
personnel at a reasonable cost. That level of protection is intended to lessen the risk of
mass casualties resulting from terrorist attacks. Full implementation of these standards
will provide some protection against all threats and will significantly reduce injuries and
fatalities for the threats upon which these standards are based. The costs associated
with those levels of protection are assumed to be less than the physical and intangible
costs associated with incurring mass casualties. Furthermore, given what we know
about terrorism, all DoD decision makers must commit to making smarter investments
with our scarce resources and stop investing money in inadequate buildings that DoD
personnel will have to occupy for decades, regardless of the threat environment. There
are three key elements of this philosophy that influence the implementation of these
standards.
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Time. Protective measures needed to provide the appropriate level of
protection must be in place prior to the initiation of a terrorist attack. Incorporating those
measures into DoD buildings is least expensive at the time those buildings are either
being constructed or are undergoing major renovation, repair, restoration, or
modification.
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Master Planning. Many of these standards significantly impact master
planning. The most significant such impact will be in standoff distances. If standoff
distances are not "reserved" they will be encroached upon and will not be available
should they become necessary in a higher threat environment. The master planning
implications of these standards are not intended to be resolved overnight. They should
be considered to be a blueprint for facilities and installations that will be implemented
over decades as those facilities and installations evolve.
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Design Practices. The philosophy of these standards is to build greater
resistance to terrorist attack into all inhabited buildings. That philosophy affects the
general practice of designing inhabited buildings. While these standards are not based
on a known threat, they are intended to provide the easiest and most economical
methods to minimize injuries and fatalities in the event of a terrorist attack. The primary
methods to achieve this outcome are to maximize standoff distance, to construct
superstructures to avoid progressive collapse, and to reduce flying debris hazards.
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