UFC 4-010-01
8 October 2003
2-3.6
Provide Mass Notification. Providing a timely means to notify building
occupants of threats and what should be done in response to those threats reduces the
risk of mass casualties.
2-3.7
Facilitate Future Upgrades. Many of the provisions of these standards
facilitate opportunities to upgrade building protective measures in the future if the threat
environment changes.
2-4
ASSUMPTIONS. Several assumptions form the foundation for these
standards.
2-4.1
Baseline Threat. The location, size, and nature of terrorist threats are
unpredictable. These standards are based on a specific range of assumed threats that
provides a reasonable baseline for the design of all inhabited DoD buildings. Designing
to resist baseline threats will provide general protection today and will establish a
foundation upon which to build additional measures where justified by higher threats or
where the threat environment increases in the future. While those baseline threats are
less than some of the terrorist attacks that have been directed against U.S. personnel in
the past, they represent more severe threats than a significant majority of historical
attacks. It would be cost prohibitive to provide protection against the worst-case
scenario in every building. The terrorist threats addressed in these standards are
further assumed to be directed against DoD personnel. Threats to other assets and
critical infrastructure are beyond the scope of these standards, but they are addressed
in the DoD Security Engineering Planning Manual. The following are the terrorist tactics
upon which these standards are based:
2-4.1.1
Explosives. The baseline explosive weights are identified in Tables B-1
and D-1 as explosive weights I, II, and III. Their means of delivery are discussed below.
2-4.1.1.1
Vehicle Bombs. For the purposes of these standards, the vehicle bomb
is assumed to be a stationary vehicle bomb. The sizes of the explosives in the vehicle
bombs associated with explosive weight I (in equivalent weight of TNT) are likely to be
detected in a vehicle during a search. Therefore, explosive weight I is the basis for the
standoff distances associated with the controlled perimeter. The quantity of explosives
associated with explosive weight II is assumed to be able to enter the controlled
perimeter undetected; therefore, explosive weight II is the basis for the standoff
distances for roadways and parking. Explosive weight II was selected because it
represents a tradeoff between likelihood of detection and the risk of injury or damage.
2-4.1.1.2
Waterborne Vessel Bombs. For the purposes of these standards,
waterborne vessels will also be assumed to contain quantities of explosives associated
with explosive weight I. That weight was selected because areas beyond the shoreline
are assumed not to be controlled perimeters.
2-4.1.1.3
Placed Bombs. Hand-carried explosives placed near buildings can
cause significant localized damage, potentially resulting in injuries or fatalities. It is
assumed that aggressors will not attempt to place explosive devices in areas near
buildings where those devices could be visually detected by building occupants casually
observing the area around the building. It is also assumed that there will be sufficient
2-3
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